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Capital for Agriculture and Rural
America: Redefining the Federal Role
By Mark Drabenstott
U
.S. agriculture depends on capital for its
success. Nearly a trillion dollars of capital
is at work in production agriculture, with
trillions more at work in the rest of the U.S. food
system. Public policy has always been concerned
with ensuring that farmers have access to ade-
quate amounts of capital at competitive terms. But
as is true for many other parts of agricultural
policy, substantial changes in the industry now
call into question both the degree and type of policy
intervention that have been undertaken in the
past.
The United States has a highly efficient market
for agricultural credit. In many respects, it is a
model market for the rest of the world. The agricul-
tural credit market provides ready amounts of credit
to farmers, at competitive rates, on terms that suit
their unique needs. Without question, public policy
has helped to develop this efficient market. But
now that it operates smoothly the question is, what
should be the public role in the future?
In this testimony, I conclude that while there may
be less need today for a federal government role in
agricultural credit, there may be more need to pay
attention to rural credit in the future. The rural
economy underperformed the metropolitan econ-
omy for much of the past decade, and a lack of
capital may be one of the causes. In the first section,
I show that U.S. agriculture is financially strong and
has ready access to capital. Although cutting gov-
ernment payments to farmers poses some risk to
farmland values, a critical part of the industry’s
capital base, other factors could offset smaller gov-
ernment payments. In the second section, I suggest
that government intervention in the agricultural
credit market is needed less now than in the past. In
the third section, I show how the rural economy
continues to be sluggish, and why a shift in federal
government attention from agricultural credit to
rural credit has merit.
AGRICULTURE’S STRONG CAPITAL
POSITION
Today’s farm balance sheet is healthy, in sharp
contrast to a decade ago when the farm recession
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the memories of the farm recession were still
fresh. The debt-asset ratio is holding steady at
about its long-run norm. Farm asset values are
rising slightly in real terms. Farm income has
stayed on a solid plateau in recent years—notwith-
standing a drop in 1994—providing most farmers
with enough cash flow to service their debt. Farm
lenders, too, are in strong condition as their port-
folios are generally clean and their capital reserves
are ample.
Net cash farm income fell 13 percent in 1994,
triggering concerns by some that agriculture’s fi-
nancial health was taking a turn for the worse.
Agricultural banks in the seven states of the Tenth
Federal Reserve District (Colorado, Missouri,
Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and
Wyoming) reported slower rates of repayment on
farm loans at the end of the year, and that pattern
has continued in the first half of 1995. But viewed
against the performance of the past several years,
and taking into account the special factors in live-
stock markets that were principally responsible for
the decline in income in 1994, agriculture continues
to be in sound financial condition. Most producers
accumulated cash reserves in the early 1990s on
which they could draw for 1994 expenses.
Agriculture’s balance sheet provides a good ba-
rometer of agriculture’s continued financial
strength. Farm assets grew more than farm debt in
1994, lifting farm equity for the third straight year.
Agriculture’s debt-asset ratio remains at 16 percent,
very close to its long-run average and well below
the 23 percent that signaled the onset of the farm
debt crisis of the mid-1980s.
As farmers have gathered financial strength, so
too have their lenders. The capital ratio of the
nation’s agricultural banks has risen steadily since
the mid-1980s and now stands at 11 percent—
higher than the capital ratio for nonagricultural
banks. The Farm Credit System (FCS) has built up
its capital base from less than $4 billion in 1988 to
more than $10 billion today. Farm lenders thus have
considerable capital to cushion any financial shocks
that might arise.
Against this general backdrop of financial
strength, agriculture has begun to increase its debt.
Farm debt increased 2 percent in 1993 and 4 percent
in 1994 after four years of holding steady. Recent
evidence from agricultural banks suggests some of
the increase is due to weaker incomes and a rolling
over of some agricultural loans. Nevertheless,
banks remain generally positive about the overall
health of farm borrowers.
With farm debt climbing again, questions have
begun to arise about whether the supply of credit to
agriculture is adequate. In part, the questions stem
from rising loan-deposit ratios at commercial banks
that lend to agriculture, which have captured most
of the recent loan growth. In the Tenth Federal
Reserve District, for example, loan-deposit ratios at
agricultural banks now top 60 percent for the first
time in a decade. Even though agricultural banks
are more fully loaned up, there are no widespread
indications that credit is unavailable to creditworthy
borrowers. To the contrary, relatively few banks
report a shortage of loanable funds. What is more,
competition for qualifying farm loans remains keen
among agricultural lenders.
Looking ahead, there are risks to agriculture’s
current financial health. Farm income is expected
to be steady in 1995, and recent market trends
support that outlook. But unexpected changes in
production and prices could lead to another drop
in farm income in 1995, which might deepen finan-
cial concerns for producers that had lower income
last year.
Potential cuts in farm programs and the impact of
such cuts on farmland values pose another risk to
the outlook. Farmland accounts for three-fourths of
total farm assets, so changes in its value have a
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base. As a significant part of farm income for many
crop producers, government farm payments have
boosted farmland values. Accordingly, reductions
in farm payments will lead to a downward adjust-
ment in land values.
The amount and timing of such an adjustment
will be determined by many factors. The effect of cuts
in farm programs on farmland values, therefore,
must be viewed in a broad context. A critical
determinant of land values will be the future course
of commodity prices. If the current outlook for sus-
tained growth in agricultural exports is realized,
commodity markets could restore much of the loss
in government payments. Another powerful de-
terminant of farmland values will be long-term
market interest rates. As Chairman Alan Greenspan
has noted in Congressional testimony, moving to-
ward a balanced budget would lead financial mar-
kets to lower long-term interest rates. Thus, if cuts
in farm programs were part of a broad, credible
effort to reduce the federal budget deficit, the result-
ing decline in long-term interest rates would help
mitigate, at least in part, the decline in farmland
values. Taken together, this broad mix of farmland
determinants suggests that steep, general declines
in land values such as seen in the mid-1980s are
unlikely. 
Overall, agriculture is in strong financial condi-
tion. Even though farm income fell in 1994, agri-
culture’s balance sheet remains fundamentally
strong. Potential cuts in farm programs would have
a downward effect on land values, but the impact
will depend importantly on forces at work in com-
modity and financial markets.
THE FEDERAL ROLE IN
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT
The agricultural credit market has not always
been as efficient as it is today. When the twentieth
century began, farmers faced credit shortages, un-
competitive interest rates, and poor terms. Public
policy played a vital role in correcting many credit
market ills. Federal intervention has taken two
broad forms: a closer of market gaps and a lender
of last resort. Comparing these roles with agricul-
ture’s current and prospective credit needs suggests
a more limited federal role in the future.
A closer of market gaps
An efficient credit market has two central fea-
tures: competition and access to broader capital
markets. When one or both are lacking, borrowers
suffer from uncompetitive interest rates, insuffi-
cient credit, or both. History shows that the most
successful federal credit programs, whether aimed
at agriculture or other sectors of the economy, have
focused on enhancing market efficiency while
avoiding credit subsidies (Bosworth and others).
The federal government has played a central role
in chartering new financial institutions for agricul-
ture that encourage competition or enhance farm-
ers’ access to capital markets. On these two counts,
perhaps the most successful chartered institution is
the Farm Credit System (FCS). Created in 1916, the
FCS has grown to become one of agriculture’s main
sources of credit, giving farmers a direct channel to
the nation’s capital markets. More recently, the
federal government chartered Farmer Mac to en-
courage more competition in farm mortgage lend-
ing and to provide lenders a means of tapping
markets for securitized loans. Although slow to
develop, Farmer Mac remains very much in the
long-standing spirit of closing market gaps.
Few gaps are left to be filled in the agricultural
credit market. Put another way, the market is highly
efficient. Interest rates to farm borrowers are linked
to market interest rates. Lenders compete keenly
over quality farm loans. Commercial banks, the
FCS, and life insurance companies all actively seek
farm loan customers, and new lenders have entered
the market. A growing portion of farm debt is
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of farm equipment or farm chemicals. And, as more
and more farm production falls under production
contracts (a trend known as industrialization) agri-
cultural processors are becoming a more prominent
source of credit (Drabenstott).
Some may argue that federal programs are needed
to ensure agriculture’s access to capital markets,
particularly as loan-deposit ratios rise at agricul-
tural banks. But the FCS retains direct access to
capital markets, and more of the loans to agriculture
made by commercial banks are at larger banks with
better access to funds. To the extent that small
agricultural banks suffer a shortage of loanable
funds, the problem might be addressed through
existing market channels, such as viable secondary
markets or perhaps giving community banks access
to FCS funds.
A lender of last resort
Another role of the federal government in the
agricultural credit market is to be a lender of last
resort. Most agree this is a legitimate role for the
federal government to play. What is unclear is how
broad the mission should be. A review of past
experience and the structure of the industry pro-
vides three conclusions that point toward a more
limited role of government lending.
First, subsidized credit programs to agriculture
have been difficult to contain and have diffused
the mission of the federal government as a lender
to agriculture. The Farmers Home Administra-
tion, predecessor to today’s Consolidated Farm Ser-
vice Agency (CFSA), began with a limited
mandate in 1946: to provide subsidized farm
ownership loans. In the postwar period, FmHA’s
mandate was successively broadened to include
everything from rural housing and water systems
to economic emergencies. Thus, the FmHA was
administering many loan programs when the
1980s farm recession hit and it was simultaneously
called upon to be a lender of last resort to agriculture
in the truest sense.
Second, the costs of being a lender of last resort
are high when lending guidelines are defined only
in broad terms. There was widespread agreement
that the FmHA should provide assistance to debt-
strapped farmers in the mid-1980s. There was not
agreement, however, on the length of assistance. In
the end, the FmHA provided long-term assistance
to many farmers at a steep cost to taxpayers. During
the past ten years, the FmHA has written off nearly
$16 billion in farm loans. 
An alternative approach would have been to
stress temporary government assistance of perhaps
a few years in length. Although difficult to estimate
precisely, such an approach almost certainly would
have cost taxpayers less, and may have left many
of the farmers that ultimately quit farming with
more equity. Against the backdrop of the past dec-
ade, guidelines that stress temporary assistance
aimed at graduating farmers to commercial lenders
appear to be more appropriate, especially in light of
Congressional efforts to balance the budget.
Third, the new structure of production agriculture
seems likely to reduce the need for government
lending in the future. Commercial farms with an-
nual sales greater than $250,000 are only 6 percent
of all farms, yet they account for more than half of
farm sales and have an average net worth greater
than $1.5 million. It is difficult to argue that such
farms need government loans. While small farms
represent the vast majority of the nation’s farms,
they increasingly turn to off-farm income for most
of their family income. Over the long run, these
farms will be helped more by economic growth in
rural America and less by subsidized farm credit
programs.
In sum, past experience and the industry’s chang-
ing structure both point to a reduced role for direct
government lending to agriculture in the future.
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RURAL CREDIT
For several decades, the federal government’s
involvement in rural credit markets has focused
almost entirely on agriculture. The logic was that if
agriculture’s capital needs were met, the farm econ-
omy—and thus the rural economy—would fare
well. That logic no longer works. The rural econ-
omy is much too diverse for agriculture alone to
sustain it. In fact, fewer than one in four rural
counties depends primarily on agriculture. Thus, a
strong farm economy is no longer sufficient for a
strong rural economy.
Even in rural areas where farming predominates,
greater economic diversity is needed to ensure eco-
nomic viability. The farm economy has enjoyed a
sustained recovery since the mid-1980s, but the
upturn has not been sufficient to promote general
economic growth in most farm-dependent counties.
From 1988 to 1993, for instance, job growth in
farming counties was slower than in metropolitan
counties or most other rural counties.
The rural economy has been generally sluggish
for more than a decade. Growth in employment, one
broad gauge of economic activity, averaged 1.2
percent a year from 1980 to 1993, the last year for
which county-level data are available. That com-
pares with job growth of 1.7 percent a year for the
nation as a whole and 1.8 percent a year in metro-
politan areas. Since 1990, jobs have grown faster in
rural than in metropolitan areas. The more favorable
comparison is the result of some pick-up in rural
growth coupled with a sharp decline in metropolitan
growth due to the 1990-91 recession. In 1993, the
gap between rural and metropolitan areas narrowed
substantially. The rural job gains have been concen-
trated in roughly half of the nation’s rural counties.
There are three reasons to believe that a lack of
capital may be a factor contributing to the sluggish
growth in the rural economy. First, rural nonfarm
businesses tend to depend heavily on community
banks as their lender, and these banks draw most of
their deposits from local funds. Thus, the credit
market for many rural borrowers may have limited
competition and limited access to capital markets.
Farmers, by contrast, can select from a number of
lenders, and some of these have direct access to
capital markets.
Second, rural development experts generally
agree that rural entrepreneurs face greater difficulty
assembling start-up capital than their urban coun-
terparts. Community banks and their regulators
have good reason to limit a bank’s risk exposure to
start-up companies. Moreover, commercial banks
can provide equity capital only by forming business
development corporations. 
Finally, loans are growing more slowly at rural
commercial banks than at metropolitan banks. Over
the past 15 years, loans have grown 5.6 percent a
year at rural banks, nearly 1.25 percentage points
less than at metropolitan banks. The slower growth
probably reflects weaker demand for loans, although
it could also suggest reluctant lending practices by
some rural bankers. Regardless of the cause, the
slower rate of loan growth underscores a slower rate
of capital formation in rural areas.
In short, the rural capital market may be less
efficient than the agricultural credit market. The
number of rural credit suppliers is fewer, and
community banks, the leading lender to rural
businesses, have less access to broader capital markets
than agricultural lenders like the FCS. While the
spread of interstate banking across the nation will
give rural borrowers greater access to capital mar-
kets, many rural businesses will continue to rely on
community banks as their main source of credit.
Is there a federal role in making rural credit
markets more efficient? Let me be clear in stating
that the rural credit market does not need an infusion
of subsidized government credit. What the market
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tition and enlarge its access to broader capital mar-
kets—the same sort of initiatives that have made the
agricultural credit market so efficient. In the main,
rural initiatives can build on existing market insti-
tutions and could be implemented at minimal cost
to taxpayers.
Four federal initiatives might be considered. First,
the federal government might commission a com-
prehensive study of rural credit markets. Such a
study is lacking and would help to guide any new
federal initiatives. Second, new programs might be
considered to assist entrepreneurs starting rural
businesses. Sluggish rural economic growth may be
caused by a lack of human capital as much as
financial capital. Several development specialists
conclude that many rural businesses lack the man-
agement or technical expertise to be successful.
Moreover, most community banks are small and
lack the staff or experience to evaluate rural busi-
ness start-ups, especially if they are in emerging
industries that are new to the community. 
Third, because community banks are so important
to rural capital formation, new initiatives that en-
hance their access to capital markets should be
explored. Steps worth considering include enhanc-
ing secondary markets and providing new means of
tapping capital markets, such as new partnerships
with the FCS.
Finally, new ways to improve rural venture capital
markets should be considered. Equity capital may
be a greater constraint to rural businesses than debt
capital. It is unreasonable to expect community
banks to solve this problem; they are in the business
of providing loans, not equity. Because venture
capital  markets are poorly developed in most rural
areas, public/private partnerships that pool the risks
of placing equity investments may be a way to
promote capital formation with limited public funds.
Some states have initiated venture capital funds that
offer promise for the future (Markley and Shaffer).
In sum, after decades of federal intervention in
the agricultural credit market, the focus of public
attention may shift to rural credit in the years ahead.
The performance of the rural economy continues to
trail that of the metropolitan economy. Addressing
that gap begins by recognizing that the rural econ-
omy is much more diverse than agriculture alone.
Finally, a handful of federal initiatives could
strengthen rural credit markets by enhancing the
availability of equity capital and providing commu-
nity banks better access to capital markets.
CONCLUSIONS
Capital is vital to the farm and rural economies.
Agriculture and its lenders today are financially
strong, and capital is readily available to credit-
worthy borrowers. The nation’s agricultural credit
market is highly efficient, thanks in part to past
federal initiatives, such as the chartering of the FCS
and Farmer Mac. Few gaps, if any, remain in this
market, suggesting more limited federal involvement
in the future. With a diverse rural economy trailing
the metropolitan economy, public attention to the
rural capital market would produce more economic
benefit than continued focus on agricultural credit
alone. New rural federal initiatives should be aimed
at increasing competition in the rural credit market
and expanding access to broader capital markets.
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